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THE TRANSFER OF FUTURE INTERESTS
IN KENTUCKY
Under the term 'future interests' are usually considered
contingent remainders, executory devises, and defeasible vested
remainders. At common law such interests were not transferable.
However, if a contingent remainder vested in the grantor of a
warranty deed, which purported to grant the interest in question
before the interest had vested, then the law courts allowed it to
take effect under the doctrine of deed by estoppel or if the
attempted conveyance were to the person having a prior estate
in the land, it was allowed to operate as a release of the grantor's
interest. Such interests could be released only to one who was
not a stranger to the title. Equity also would specifically enforce
such an attempted conveyance of a future interest after such
interest had once vested.
In this country there are still some jurisdictions that follow
the common law and refuse to allow a conveyance of a future
interest to stand unless it comes under one of three methods just
stated, under the doctrine of deed by estoppel, a release to a
party in interest, or specific performance of an executory agree-
ment. Some jurisdictions have changed the common law rules
by judicial legislation and now hold them transferable. A large
number of states have passed statutes expressly stating that they
are assignable, devisable, or transmissible. A fourth group have
adjudged future interests within the conveyancing acts which
state that all interests in land may be passed by deed or will. In
this fourth group we find Kentucky.
The question whether contingent interests are "interests in
land" within the conveyancing act and can be transferred like
present vested estates first came before the Kentucky court in a
request for specific performance and the court gave effect to the
contingent remainderman's agreement to convey his interest.
No mention was made of the statute and the case comes clearly
within the early principle that in equity such an agreement will
be treated as an executory contract to convey.1 Six years later,
however, we find the court saying that under the Kentucky
statute as to conveyances, a contingent remainder in land passes
I Grayson v. Tyler's Adm'x, 1882, 80 Ky. 358.
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by deed and that it may be sold under a decree of the court.2
"Section 6, article 1, chapter 63," the court said, "of the
General Statutes provides: 'Any interest in or claim to real
estate may be disposed of by deed or will in writing.' This pro-
vision clearly embraces a contingent remainder interest in land."
This proposition has been consistently maintained in later cases,3
but the court has pointed out that where the remainder never
vests, the grantee gets nothing.4 In Kendrick v. Scott,5 however,
we find the court, unmindful of its earlier decisions, saying that
before the death of the life tenant the contingent remainderman
has no alienable interest. In the case before the court the grantor
of the remainder in question died before the life tenant did and
the estate never vested. What the court evidently intended to
say was that if the estate never vested the purchaser got nothing.
The statement made by the court is inconsistent with its earlier
and its later decisions and it is submitted that it does not repre-
sent the law in Kentucky.
The court was called upon in McCall's Administrator v.
Ham ptonG to determine whether the sale of an expectancy in a
father's estate was valid. The court rightly decided that it was
not, as such an expectancy was a naked possibility or contin-
gency, not founded on a right or coupled with an interest. The
court, however, conceded that a contingent remainder could be
sold or assigned.
The Kentucky court has held that a contingent remainder-
man's interest can be subjected to the claims of judgment
creditors under a statute governing levies on executions,7 and it
has also held that contingent remainders belonging to infants
can be sold under a statutory partition of real estate.8 One
further case should be noted among the Kentucky decisions, that
of Lindenberger v. Cornell et aL,9 where the court decided that a
vested remainder subject to defeasance, may be sold and a good
title conveyed by deed as in the case of a contingent remainder
White's Tr. v. White, 1888, 86 Ky. 602, 7 S. W. 26.3Davis v. Willson, 1903, 115 Ky. 639, 74 S. W. 696; Bank of Taylors-
ville v. Vandyke, 1914, 159 Ky. 201, 166 S. W. 1024.
4Roy v. West, Treas., 1922, 194 Ky. 96, 238 S. W. 167; Boggess v.
Crail, 1928, 224 Ky. 97, 5 S. W. (2nd) 906.
81923, 200 Ky. 202, 254 S. W. 422.
0 1895, 98 Ky. 166, 32 S. W. 406.1Jacob v. Howard, 1893, 15 Ky. L. R. 133, 22 S. W. 332.
8Xutter v. Russell, 1860, 3 Metef. (Ky.) 163.
'1921, 199 Ky. 844, 229 S. W. 54.
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but that in neither case will the purchaser acquire anything by
his purchase if the event which creates the defeasance occurs in
the one case, or if the contingency which vests the estate in the
other never happens.
The rule that contingent future interests could not be con-
veyed grew out of the difficulty of making a transfer of an
interest in land to take effect in the future under the old forms
of conveyancing and also out of the policy of the law against
allowing the assignment of any choses in action. The early
common law judges objected to anything that looked like a sale
of a law suit. Champerty and maintenance were anathema to
them. All this has long since been changed and today there is
no good reason why future interests should not be transferable.
The Court of Appeals in Kentucky reached a right result when
it held that such interests came within the meaning of the con-
veyancing act.
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